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RULE 10b-5 DEVELOPMENTS-DAMAGES AND
CONTRIBUTION
I. 10b-5 DAMAGES
Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) limits
plaintiffs in a private damage action under rule 10b-51 to recovery of the
actual damages the defendant's fraudulent conduct caused.' In enacting
the federal securities laws, Congress failed to provide any guidance
regarding how courts should calculate a claimant's actual damages.'
When an individual with material inside information4 defrauds an in-
vestor in a face-to-face transaction, 5 the investor may recover damages
based on tort liability.' Calculating damages for investors injured by in-
sider trading in the open market, however, presents additional complica-
tions.' Although investors do not deal directly with insiders on a public
exchange or in an over-the-counter transaction,' an insider who trades on
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). Courts implied a private cause of action
under 10b-5 based on a tort liability theory. Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa.
1946).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
See Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEo. L.J. 1093, 1095 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Jacobs]. Congress' failure to delineate the method courts should use to
calculate damages arguably indicates Congress intended courts to construe the antifraud
provisions flexibly to further the remedial purposes of the provisions. See Superintendent
of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers,
Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 169-70 (2d Cir. 1980).
' See generally Abeles, Price & Schwab, Inside Information' Prevention of Abuse, 15
Corp. Practice Series (B.N.A. 1979) pp. A-10 & 11. Inside information is material information
about certain stock known by only select individuals who either have direct access to the in-
formation or were informed by someone with direct access. Note, Damages to Uninformed
Traders for Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 300 n.14
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Impersonal Exchanges]. Material information is information
which would likely cause a change in the market price of stock if the public knew the infor-
mation. Id. at 300. See, e.g., TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444-49
(1976) (information is material if there is substantial likelihood disclosure would influence in-
vestors to buy, sell, or hold security); United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (undisclosed information regarding pending
tender offers or mergers is material inside information); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (undisclosed, adverse information about cor-
poration's earnings is inside information).
5 See generally Impersonal Exchanges, supra note 4, at 302-05. In a face-to-face trans-
action, the plaintiff trades directly with the insider. Id. at 306.
6 See text accompanying note 1 supra.
See generally Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1130-37. Trading on the open market refers to
transactions where no direct pecuniary gain accrues to the defendant who trades on inside
information. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341 n.1 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring).
' Impersonal Exchanges, supra note 4, at 306.
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the open market without disclosing material inside information may
become liable under rule 10b-5 for damages to all investors who trade
during the period of nondisclosure.' In addition, the damage calculation
may hold the defendant liable for any decline in a security's value," even
though market forces and events unrelated to a defendant's fraudulent
conduct influence the value of securities." Thus, a measure of damages
' See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d
Cir. 1974). Shapiro held that the disclose or abstain rule applicable to the use of inside infor-
mation effectively eliminated the requirement that the plaintiff in rule 10b-5 litigation be in
contractual privity with the defendant by purchasing from or selling to the defendant. Id. at
236-37; see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (anyone possessing material inside information
must either disclose it or abstain from trading); Note, Securities Regulation-Fraud-Im-
personal Market Investors, Unaffected by the WrongfulActs of an Insider Cannot Recover
Damages from the Insider in a Private Suit Under Rule 10b-5, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 303,306-07
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Impersonal Market Investors].
In Shapiro, investors purchased Douglas Aircraft stock based on a favorable earnings
statements the company released on June 7, 1966. 495 F.2d at 231. Shortly thereafter,
Douglas' management learned of a decrease in the company's earnings. Id. at 232. Douglas'
managers and certain tippees of the confidential information then sold their Douglas stock
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) before the company's public disclosure of a revised
earnings statement. Id. at 232. The substantial sales by insiders and tippees forced the price
of Douglas stock down. Id. at 233. Investors who purchased Douglas stock between the first
and second earnings statements sued the insiders and tippees for defrauding purchasers by
selling stock based on material information unavailable to the public. Id. The defendants
argued they owed a duty to disclose the material inside information only to investors who
purchased the specific shares of stock the defendants sold. Id. at 236-37. The Second Circuit,
however, refused to limit the disclose or abstain rule to face-to-face transactions. Id. The
Shapiro court held that the defendants owed a duty to disclose material inside information
to all investors on a public exchange. Id. Since the antifraud provisions operate to ensure
the integrity and efficiency of the securities markets, the court reasoned that requiring
defendants to disclose information only in face-to-face transactions would frustrate the ob-
jectives of the securities laws. Id. See also Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (national economy depends
on integrity and efficiency of the stock market).
The elimination of the privity requirement in Shapiro, along with the Shapiro court's
suggestion that the mere possession of inside information generates the duty to disclose,
potentially makes defendants liable to numerous investors even though the defendant had
no direct contact with those investors. Impersonal Market Investors, supra note 9, at 306.
Thus a defendant faces extensive liability although he traded only a certain number of
shares and realized a certain profit. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 321 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (defendants held liable for $360,000, 30 times defen-
dant's profit). In Chiarella v. United States, however, the Supreme Court limited defen-
dants' liability by squarely holding that mere possession of inside information does not give
rise to a duty to disclose. 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). The Chiarella Court held that the duty to
disclose arises out of a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Id. In Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc., the Second Circuit noted that an insider who trades on or tips information
violates a fiduciary duty. 635 F.2d 156, 165 n.14 (1980); see Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 229 & 230 n.12 (1980).
o See text accompanying notes 26 & 35 infra.
" Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J.,
concurring); see text accompanying note 32 infra. See generally Note, The Measurement of
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which neglects to consider the seriousness of the defendant's fraud, the
market impact of the fraud, or the impact on the trading of individual in-
vestors potentially subjects insiders trading in the open market to exor-
bitant damages grossly disproportionate to the defendant's misconduct.'2
Lacking guidance from Congress, courts apply various methods for
calculating damages for open market violations of rule 10b-5.'3 In Af-
filiated Ute Citizens v. United States,4 the United States Supreme
Court established the out-of-pocket measure as the measure of actual
damages under section 28(a).' 5 The out-of-pocket measure of damages
permits a plaintiff-seller to recover the difference between the fair value
of what the seller received and the fair value of what the seller would
have received absent the defendant's fraudulent conduct. 6 In contrast,
Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Actively Traded Securities].
12 Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1132; see text accompanying note 32 infra.
3 See, e.g., Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1346 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring) (damages computed as difference between price plaintiff paid and ac-
tual value of stock on purchase date); Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 228 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976) (damages equal difference between price paid and
market price after general public discovered fraud); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (recovery of price reasonable in-
vestor would have paid to reinvest in market within reasonable time after public disclosure
of material information); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir.
1970) (damages calculated as difference between purchase price and amount plaintiff received
upon subsequent sale before he learned of fraud); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (damages equal all profits defendant accrued from
fraudulent transaction). See generally Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Security
Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 277 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Mullaney]; Actively Traded Securities, supra note 11.
,' 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
, See id. at 155; text accompanying note 31 infra.
16 406 U.S. at 155. In Affiliated Ute, Affiliated Ute Citizens (AUC) entered into an
agreement with First Security Bank of Utah (the bank) to distribute the Ute Indian tribe's
assets between mixed-blood and full-blooded members. Id. 133-36. AUC's articles of incor-
poration required that mixed-bloods who desired to sell their stock in AUC give rights of
first refusal to tribe members. Id. at 137. A mixed-blood could not sell his stock to a non-
tribe member at a price lower than the price the seller offered to members. Id. Two bank
employees defrauded the AUC by soliciting and accepting stock orders from non-Indians,
and inducing mixed-bloods to sell their shares without disclosing to the mixed-bloods that
investors were then paying higher prices for the shares in another market. Id. at 153. The
bank employees purchased the mixed-bloods' shares for $350 to $500 per share, and resold
them in the market for $500 to $700 per share. Id. at 147. The United States District Court
for the District of Utah computed each plaintiff's damages as the difference between the
value of the AUC shares at the time the plaintiff sold them and the fair value of what the
plaintiff received. Id. at 154. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit measured the damages as the
defendants' profits on resale. Id.; Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir.
1970), affd in part rev'd in part, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972). The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and agreed that the proper measure
of damages was the difference between the value of the shares which the plaintiffs sold and
the fair value of what the plaintiffs received. See 406 U.S. at 156. The Supreme Court con-
cluded upon evidence presented in the District Court that the stock was worth $1500 per
1982]
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the out-of-pocket measure grants a defrauded buyer the difference be-
tween the fair value of what he gave up and the fair value of what he
would have given up absent the defendant's fraudulent conduct.' When
the defendant's gain exceeds the plaintiff's actual loss, damages are
equal to the defendant's profit. 8
In Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean,9 the Fifth Circuit recently ap-
plied the out-of-pocket measure of damages established in Affiliated Ute
to compensate investors who defendants fraudulently induced to pur-
chase securities in the open market based on a materially misleading cor-
porate issuer's prospectus." In Huddleston, Texas International Speed-
way, Inc. (TIS) filed with the SEC a registration statement and prospec-
tus2" which offered over $4,000,000 in securities for the construction of
an automobile racetrack." Thirteen months after TIS sold the entire
share at the time of the plaintiffs' sales. Id. This measure of damages entitled each claimant
to the difference between the amount the claimant received per share of stock sold and
$1500 per share. Id. at 155.
" Harris v. American Investment Co., 523 F.2d 220, 228 (8th Cir. 1975), cert denied,
423 U.S. 1058 (1976) (defrauded buyer recovered difference between price paid and market
price after general public discovered the fraud).
Rule 10b-5 protects only buyers and sellers of securities from fraudulent conduct. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.10; 5B A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 1Ob-5, § 260.02, at 11-11 (1980). The
rule provides no remedy for an investor who was fraudulently induced not to trade. Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Inc., 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952); see text accompanying note 75 infra.
16 406 U.S. at 155. The Affiliated Ute Court required that a defendant held liable for a
rule lOb-5 violation disgorge his profits to prevent defendants from realizing the benefits of
fraudulent activities. See id. The Supreme Court intended the disgorgement measure to ap-
ply when defendants gain profits that exceed the plaintiffs' losses. Id.; Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). In Janigan, a defendant-
corporate director purchased the plaintiffs' stock in the director's company without inform-
ing the sellers of a backlog of orders that indicated the company expected to show increas-
ing profits. Id. at 785. The Janigan court distinguished situations involving a material
misrepresentation that induces an investor to buy stock and situations involving a
misrepresentation which induces stockholders to sell. Id. at 786. When a misrepresentation
influences an investor to buy stock, awarding the purchaser the difference between the
price he paid and the actual value of the stock compensates him. Id. When a misrepresenta-
tion induces the shareholder to sell, however, the seller's loss of future earnings, if any, re-
mains highly speculative. Id. The fraudulent buyer should, therefore, relinquish his unjust
enrichment. Id. The Second Circuit recently applied the disgorgement measure to limit a
defendant's liability rather than to prevent unjust enrichment. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers,
Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1980); see text accompanying notes 49-51 infra.
" 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 555-56.
' Id. at 539. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) requires any person who
offfers securities for purchase or sale to file a registration statement with the SEC. 15
U.S.C. § 77e (1976). Section 4 of the '33 Act exempts from the section 5 requirements trans-
actions by an underwriter unless the underwriter offers to buy or sell new issue securities.
15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976). Section 4 requires issuers of new issue securities to file both a
registration statement and a corporate issuer's prospectus that must remain effective for 90
days. Id.
1 640 F.2d at 539.
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issue, the corporation filed a petition for Chapter X bankruptcy.' In a
class action alleging claims under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, purchasers
of TIS securities sued TIS' directors, executives, accountants, under-
writers, and contractors for damages that the purchasers allegedly suf-
fered when they purchased TIS securities in the open market." The jury
found that the defendants violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by
recklessly preparing a misleading prospectus which materially
misrepresented the construction costs of the speedway and the com-
pany's working capital.' The District Court for the Northern District of
Texas determined in Huddleston that the rescissional measure of
damages properly measured the plaintiffs' losses. The court calculated
the claimants' damages as the price each investor paid to purchase TIS
securities minus the proceeds each investor received upon selling the
securities.26 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district
court's application of the rescissory measure of damages because no
I Id. The executives and directors of Texas International Speedway (TIS) alleged that
Texas International Speedway went bankrupt not because the directors underestimated
construction costs but because they misjudged the racing market in Texas and failed to at-
tract sufficient spectators. Brief for Appellants LoPatin & Share at 12, Huddleston v. Her-
man & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants).
2 640 F.2d at 539. The plaintiff in Huddleston alleged that TIS filed with the SEC a
prospectus which was misleading because it misrepresented construction costs. Id. In addi-
tion to the plaintiff's charge that the defendants conspired to violate the antifraud provisions
of federal securities laws, the plaintiff also alleged that the defendants conspired to violate
the Texas Securities Act. Id. The Fifth Circuit determined that the defendants were not
sellers of securities under the Texas Act. Id. at 551; see TEx. REv. CIO. STAT. art.
581-33(A)(2) (Supp. 1982).
640 F.2d at 539-40 n.2.
, Id. at 554. See also Gottlieb v. Sandia American Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 990 (E.D.
Pa. 1969), affd in par rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971);
Mullaney, supra note 13, at 284-85. The rescissional measure of damages best applies in
cases involving privity between the plaintiff and the defendant, or in cases when the defend-
ant owes the plaintiff some fiduciary duty. Id. at 285; see text accompanying note 31 infra.
The Huddleston court entered a $3,000,000 judgment against the defendants to cover
the plaintiffs' alleged losses and prejudgment interest. 640 F.2d at 560. A court may exer-
cise discretion in awarding prejudgment interest in securities litigation. Chris-Craft In-
dustries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172, 191 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 430 U.S. 1 (1977). See also Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962); Wolf v. Frank,
477 F.2d 467, 479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 416
F.2d 1189, 1191-92 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub. nom. Muscat v. Norte & Co., 397 U.S. 989
(1970); Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1160-61. In addition, the district court in Huddleston award-
ed plaintiffs $500,000 in attorneys' fees. Brief for Appellant, supra note 23, at 44. Section
28(a) of the '34 Act makes no mention of awarding attorneys' fees to the successful party in
rule 10b-5 litigation. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.30 (1976); 15
U.S.C. § 7Sbb(a) (1976). American courts generally refuse to award attorneys fees except
when a statute authorizes the award. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U.S. 240 (1975). Courts may deviate from the general rule, however, and award the suc-
cessful party attorneys' fees if a party brings or maintains an action or defense in bad faith.
F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1974) (at-
torneys' fees awarded if party raises unfounded action or defense).
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privity existed between the plaintiffs and defendants.' Since the plain-
tiffs in Huddleston purchased the TIS securities in the open market
rather than by dealing face-to-face with the defendants, the purchase
price never directly accrued to the defendants. 8 Additionally, the Fifth
Circuit refused to attribute the decline in value of TIS securities entirely
to the defendants' deceit, since market forces also influence the price of
stock." Concluding that the out-of-pocket measure of damages more ac-
curately reflected the loss the defendants' deceit caused the claimants,
the Huddleston court determined that the plaintiff should recover the
difference between the purchase price of the security and the fair
market value of the security at the time the plaintiffs purchased the
stock."
Although the Affiliated Ute out-of-pocket measure of damages ap-
plied by the Huddleston court may provide an appropriate remedy in a
face-to-face transaction,"' the out-of-pocket measure potentially subjects
2 640 F.2d at 554-55; see also Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1114. A proper application of the
rescissory measure of damages presupposes privity between plaintiff and defendant. See
Mullaney, supra note 13, at 285; Actively Traded Securities, supra note 11, at 377; text ac-
companying note 31 infra.
2' 640 F.2d at 555.
' Id. On a public exchange, market forces and events unrelated to a defendant's
fraudulent conduct influence the value of securities. Id. See also Green v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring).
1 640 F.2d at 555. In Huddleston the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for a determina-
tion of liability since the district court failed to submit the reliance or causation issues to the
jury. Id. at 550. The Huddleston court recommended that on remand the plaintiffs should
employ a special master, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, or an expert
witness, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706, to compute the actual value of the stock
on the date of the fraudulent transaction. Id. at 553-54; FED. R. Civ. P. 53; FED. R. Evm. 706.
To limit defendants' accountability, some courts analyze the securities' prices to determine
the decrease the defendant's conduct caused. Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); see generally Actively Traded Securities, supra note 11, at 386-98.
"' 406 U.S. at 155. The out-of-pocket measure is classified as restitutionary recovery.
DoBBs, LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.2, at 595 (1973). The theory of restitution demands that the party
who has been unjustly enriched at another's expense pay back his fraudulent gains. Ra-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, comment a, at 19 (1936). Restitutionary recovery accom-
panies a rescissory measure of damages. Jacobs, supra note 13, at 1115. True rescission
voids a contract and returns the parties to the position the parties occupied before they
entered into the contract. DOBBS, supra § 4.1, at 222, 223 (discussing rescission at common
law).
Rescission provides an appropriate remedy in securities fraud when a seller defrauded
in a face-to-face transaction seeks to recover his stock from the buyer after the price of the
stock increases. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring). When the fraudulent buyer no longer possesses the stock, the plain-
tiff receives restitution in damages equal to the actual monetary value of the stock on the
date the defendant owed a duty to return the stock. Id. Courts generally use either the date
of the transaction or the date of the disclosure of fraud to determine the stock's value. See,
e.g., Harris v. American Investment Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976) (value of stock on date public discovered fraud); Gottlieb v. Sandia
American Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d
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insiders trading on the open market to excessive damages.2 To prevent
an excessive damage award, the Second Circuit in Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc." recently declined to apply the out-of-pocket measure of
damages to an insider's open market violations of rule 10b-5. The Elkind
court noted that the out-of-pocket measure failed to consider the volume
of the defendants' insider trading or the market impact of the defendants'
misrepresentations. 4 In an effort to both compensate defrauded in-
vestors and award damages commensurate with the defendants' gain,
the Elkind court permitted investors to recover the post-purchase
decline in the market value of their stock up to a reasonable time after
the defendant publicly disclosed inside information, 5 but limited the pur-
510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wechsler v. Gottlieb, 404 U.S. 938 (1971) (value of stock
on date of fraudulent transaction). When a defrauded buyer seeks damages from a seller
after the stock decreases in value, courts generally award the buyer the difference between
the purchase price and the sale price of the stock. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1118-19.
In open market violations, rescission and restitution are inapplicable because no face-
to-face transaction between the buyer and seller occurs, and the defendant receives no
direct pecuniary gain from the purchaser. See Impersonal Exchanges, supra note 4, at 312
& 315. Thus, the defendant can return neither the stock nor the monetary value of the
stock. The question whether the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation or omission ac-
tually induced investors to buy or sell remains.
32 Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1132; see, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th
Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). In Fridrich, tippees made minor purchases of
Old Line Life Insurance Co. shares on the over-the-counter market based on insider infor-
mation of a pending merger. Id. at 308-09. Shareholders uninformed of the pending merger
sold their shares for a small profit. Id. at 311. When the news of the merger became public,
the sellers sued the tippees for the difference between the plaintiffs' sale price and the
highest value of Old Line stock after the public learned the information. Id. at 312-13. Pur-
suant to the judgment of the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, the plain-
tiffs recovered over $360,000, almost 30 times the defendants' profit. Id. at 313. On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit refused to hold defendants liable to purchasers on the open market absent
proof that the defendants' gain caused plaintiffs' loss. Id. at 318. Arguably the Sixth Circuit
refused to find the defendants liable to protect them from damages grossly in excess of the
injury their conduct caused. Mullaney, supra note 13, at 279.
" 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
'. Id. at 170. An investor who trades a nominal number of shares in a heavy-volume
market has little impact on the value of the stock he trades. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1134
n.222. If the insider trades an insignificant number of shares in comparison to all the shares
traded, his transactions will have little effect on the value of the shares. Id. Since a defendant
who trades on the open market incurs liability to many plaintiffs, however, the defendant may
pay a damage award grossly out of proportion to the volume of the defendant's trading. Id.
' 635 F.2d at 173. The district court in Elkind found the defendants liable for tipping
inside information about the deflated value of Liggett stock to investors who traded Liggett
stock on July 10 and July 17. 472 F. Supp. 123; 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The district court
measured damages as the difference between the price the plaintiffs paid to purchase Lig-
gett stock and the price of the stock eight trading days after Liggett issued a corrective
press release about Liggett's earnings on July 18. Id. at 132. The eight trading days
represented the time during which the market adjusted to the inside information. Id.; see
text accompanying note 47 infra. The Second Circuit released the defendants from liability
for the July 10 tip because they lacked the requisite scienter for rule 10b-5 liability. 635 F.2d
at 167-68. The Elkind court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
1982] R ULE 10b-5 1003
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chasers' recovery to the amount of profits the defendants gained by sell-
ing before the defendant company released the information.
3 8
In Elkind, the chief financial officer of Liggett & Myers, Inc. (Lig-
gett) confidentially informed an outside financial analyst of a decline in
the corporation's earnings. 7 The analyst then disclosed this information
to one of his firm's stockholders, who immediately sold 1,800 shares of
Liggett stock for his customers.38 The purchasers of Liggett stock
sought damages under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 for the failure of Lig-
gett's officers to disclose material information about Liggett's earnings,
and for the officers' tipping of inside information to individuals who then
sold Liggett stock. The District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that the officers' failure to disclose information about
Liggett's earnings did not constitute a section 10(b) violation.4" The court
held the defendants liable, however, for tipping material inside informa-
tion to outside investors.4' The district court applied the out-of-pocket
measure of damages,42 calculated as the difference between the plain-
tiffs' purchase prices and the price of Liggett stock eight trading days.
after Liggett disclosed the inside information. 3 The district court awarded
the number of trading days that provided a reasonable time period for the market to adjust
to the public disclosure about Liggett's genuine financial condition. 635 F.2d at 173.
Id. at 172-73; see text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
635 F.2d at 161. On July 17, one-day before Liggett released a preliminary earnings
statement, a financial analyst questioned Liggett's chief financial officer about a possible
decrease in Liggett's earnings. Id. The officer responded affirmatively, adding that the in-
formation was confidential. Id.
8 Id.
Id. at 158; see text accompanying note 35 supra.
472 F. Supp. at 128.
41 Id.
42 635 F.2d at 162; see text accompanying notes 17, 18 supra; note 67 infra.
41 635 F.2d at 162. The plaintiffs in Elkind might have sold their Liggett stock earlier
than they actually sold if they had known the undisclosed information about the company's
depressed earnings. The district court assigned a value of the defrauded plaintiffs' share
equal to the price of Liggett stock eight trading days after the company released an ac-
curate earnings statement. 473 F. Supp. at 133. The district court's measure assumes that
within eight days the market will adjust to the accurate earnings information, and the price
of the stock at the end of that period will approximate the actual value of the stock on the
date the plaintiff sold. 635 F.2d at 162. See also Harris v. American Investment Co., 523
F.2d 220, 227 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); text accompanying note 67 in-
fra.
The district court's out-of-pocket measure in Elkind represents a version of the "cover"
measure of damages applied in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). In Mitchell, the Tenth Circuit awarded defrauded sellers
of Texas Gulf Sulphur stock the money required for the sellers to have reinvested in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur stock within a reasonable time after the sellers learned of the
fraudulently withheld information. 446 F.2d at 105. The Mitchell court thus restricted the
seller's award to the difference between the seller's sale price and the highest value of
Texas Gulf Sulphur stock on a reasonable number of trading days after the public
disclosure. Id. Likewise the Elkind court denied a plaintiff any additional recovery if he
waited longer than eight days to dispose of his stock. 635 F.2d at 162.
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a total of $740,000 in damages upon the condition that any unclaimed
portion of the damage award revert to Liggett." Liggett appealed both
the finding of liability and the computation of damages to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit."
The Second Circuit in Elkind disagreed with the district court's ap-
plication of the out-of-pocket measure of damages in actions involving
open market violations since the measure potentially subjects defendants
to damages grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the defend-
ants' fraud."8 To prevent a disproportionate damage assessment, the Se-
cond Circuit limited the plaintiffs' recovery to the profits the defendants
gained from selling stock before all parties could trade on an equal infor-
mational basis. 7 When claimants' losses exceeded the defendants' profits
from insider trading, 8 the Elkind court suggested limiting the recovery
to each plaintiff's pro rata share of the defendants' gain. 9
The disgorgement of profits" measure applied by the Second Circuit
" 472 F. Supp. at 135. The district court in Elkind awarded the plaintiffs prejudgment
interest. 635 F.2d at 162; see text accompanying note 26 supra.
41 635 F.2d at 162; see text accompanying notes 35 supra; 46-48 infra.
41 635 F.2d at 170. The elimination of the privity requirement in securities fraud litiga-
tion leaves defendants subject to huge class actions and enormous damages. 11 STETSON L.
REV. 126, 140 (1981); Mullaney, supra note 13, at 278; see text accompanying note 9 supra.
For instance, courts may hold a defendant who trades 10 shares to one investor liable for
the losses of several people who traded at the same time. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1130-31;
see text accompanying notes 48-49 infra.
17 635 F.2d at 173.
" See generally, Impersonal Exchanges, supra note 4, dt 306. An investor who trades
securities on a public exchange without disclosing material inside information does not deal
directly with investors who suffer losses by trading on inadequate information. Id. If a court
holds a defendant liable to all investors who suffer from his failure to disclose the
defendant's liability may well exceed his gains from his insider trading. Id.; see text accom-
panying note 46 supra.
" 635 F.2d at 173. A pro rata allocation of the defendant's gains distributes the gains
among the claimants based on the number of shares each claimant traded during the period
of insider trading. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1132. The Elkind court determined that the
district court should distribute the defendant's gains pro rata among the plaintiffs by deter-
mining the ratio of each plaintiff's loss to the total loss by all members of the plaintiff class.
635 F.2d at 173. Each plaintiff then multiplied the ratio by the defendant's total profit. See,
e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46, 55-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affld, 494 F.2d 1301 (1974).
635 F.2d at 172. The disgorgement of profits measure of damages rests on the
restitutional theory that a fraudulent party should not retain the profits of his fraud.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, comment a, at 19 (1936). Some courts employ the
disgorgement of profits measure in private damages actions to ensure that the defendant
relinquishes all his total unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st
Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Mullaney, supra note 13, at 283-84. Regardless of
whether private plaintiffs seek recovery, the SEC may seek disgorgement in SEC ad-
ministrative proceedings under rule 10b-5 to ensure that defendants receive no profits from
fraudulent or manipulative practices. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Jacobs,
supra note 3, at 1168. The Second Circuit in Elkind invoked the disgorgement measure to
limit the defendants' liability while compensating private plaintiffs. 635 F.2d at 173; see text
accompanying notes 48 & 49 supra.
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in Elkind eliminates the possibility of windfall recoveries which bear no
relation to the defendants' misconduct,51 and awards damages commen-
surate to the harm the defendants' fraudulent conduct caused.2 The
disgorgement method also avoids the difficulty of determining the value
of shares53 by requiring the plaintiff only to prove the time, amount, and
price per share of his purchase, the decline in price when the purchaser
learned the inside information or the information became available to
the public, and that a reasonable investor would not have purchased or
paid as high a price if he knew the inside information. 4 Finally, the
disgorgement measure deters tipping of inside information by requiring
defendants to relinquish the profits they earn by trading on inside infor-
mation.5
Several problems exist, however, with the disgorgement measure of
damages. First, the disgorgement measure requires as a condition of
recovery that the wrongdoer profited from his fraudulent conduct.
Gain to the defendant, however, is not a prerequisite to liability under
rule 10b-5.17 Furthermore, although the disgorgement measure seeks to
11 635 F.2d at 172. Note, A New Measure of Damages for Tippee-Trading Violations
Under Rule 10b-5, 1981 BRIGHAM YOUNG L. REV. 407, 416; see text accompanying note 46
supra. Possibly the Elkind court focused on disgorging the defendants' profits rather than
compensating plaintiffs because of the size of the defendants' sales. The defendants sold
1800 shares on the open market. Id. at 161. The district court awarded damages of over
$1,000,000. Id. at 162. Arguably the damage award far exceeded the defendants' profits.
" 635 F.2d at 172. The Elkind court reasoned that a wrongdoer who sells only a few
shares of stock realizes only a small profit and causes only slight injury to other investors.
Id. The Second Circuit concluded that the amount of profit the defendant realizes reflects
the degree of harm the fraudulent conduct causes. Id.
1 635 F.2d at 170. A court may have difficulty determining the actual value of stock
because market forces other than the defendants' fraudulent conduct influence the value of
shares. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J.,
concurring). In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, the Fifth Circuit recommended the ser-
vices of a special master, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the testimony of an
expert witness, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, in computing stock's actual worth
when the court applies a damage measure, such as the out-of-pocket measure, which re-
quires the court to determine the stock's actual value. See Huddleston v. Herman &
McLean, 640 F.2d 534, 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1981) (recommending use of special master or ex-
pert witness); FED. R. CIV. PRO. 53; FED. R. EviD. 706; text accompanying note 30 supra. The
Second Circuit in Elkind disputed the use of experts and masters, and noted that the valua-
tion of shares of stock often rests on hypothetical or speculative evidence. 635 F.2d at 170.
The Second Circuit also disagreed with the district court's method of valuing stocks before
disclosure of inside information as equal to the market value of the stock after the company
releases the information and the market absorbs the news. Id. The market reaction to the
inside information at an earlier time does not necessarily reflect the market reaction at a
later time. Id.
635 F.2d at 172.
Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1168. Whether the disgorgement measure of damage actual-
ly deters fraud is highly questionable. A defendant may not hesitate to engage in fraudulent
conduct if he stands to lose only the profits he makes.
635 F.2d at 172.
17 See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 750 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
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prevent windfall recoveries to plaintiffs, some claimants may recover ex-
cessive damages if events unrelated to the defendant's conduct depress
the market price of the stock. 8 Finally, since the disgorgement method
limits each plaintiff to a pro rata share of the defendants' gain, each
plaintiffs ultimate recovery may be insufficient to justify the time and
expense of litigation.59 If the potential recovery is inadequate, few
defrauded investors will file suits for violations of section 10(b) or rule
10b-5. Since liability to private investors serves as a deterrent to rule
10b-5 violations, 0 discouraging private investors from filing private
damage actions circumvents the purpose behind the implied private
right of action.
While the disgorgement of profits measure of damages may fail in
some instances to adequately compensate investors by limiting
claimants to pro rata recovery of the defendants' gain, the out-of-pocket
measure applied by the Fifth Circuit in Huddleston seeks to compensate
investors for losses the defendants' insider trading directly caused."
Since one of the primary functions of the private right of action under
section 10(b) is to compensate investors injured by insider trading, 2 an
appropriate damage award puts the plaintiff in the position he would
have occupied if no transaction occurred." The difference between a
stock's purchase or sale price and the stock's value on the date of pur-
chase or sale represents the amount by which the claimant invested a
greater amount or received a lesser amount than he would have paid or
received absent the defendant's fraud. 4 Thus, the out-of-pocket measure
grants plaintiffs a damage award which offsets any loss the plaintiff suf-
fered due to defendants' deceit.
Several problems arise, however, when courts apply the out-of-
(1968) (party held responsible for tortious conduct although he realized no benefit); Fischer
v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (culpable party who prepares fraudulent
financial statement held liable regardless of interest in transaction); Comment, Insiders'
Liability Under Rule lOb-5 for the Illegal Purchase, 78 YALE L.J. 864, 876 (1969).
The Second Circuit also expressed concern that the disgorgement measure of damages
duplicates the disgorgement remedy imposed by the SEC. 635 F.2d at 172; 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976). The SEC may obtain disgorgement of profits, and then order the profits distributed
pro rata among defrauded investors. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
1301, 1307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (defendants paid profits into escrow
fund, which was distributed by court orders to defrauded sellers).
" See 635 F.2d at 172-73; text accompanying note 29 supra.
"' See 635 F.2d at 173; Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1134 (when court distributes defendants'
profits pro rata, recovery by individual plaintiff likely to be insignificant).
0 Impersonal Exchanges, supra note 4, at 302-05.
61 See Actively Traded Securities, supra note 11, at 383-85; text accompanying note 67
infra (difficulty in valuating securities thwarts adequate compensation).
62 Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); Kohler v. Kohler, 208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D. Wisc. 1962).
1 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d 104-05 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971); Impersonal Exchanges, supra note 4, at 304.
" Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir. 1971).
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pocket measure of damages to compensate investors injured by insiders'
trading on the open market. Since investors in the open market do not
deal directly with insiders, a question arises whether the insider's
fraudulent conduct induced the investor to trade.', In addition, when the
insider becomes liable to all investors who trade during the period of
nondisclosure, the claimants' losses, because of the volume and price of
their purchases, may be grossly disproprotionate to the defendants' gain
from insider trading.6 Finally, although the insider becomes liable for
the difference between the fair value of what the plaintiff received and
what the plaintiff should have received, the value of the stock is difficult
to determine. 7
A third measure of damages, the causation-in-fact measure, evades
the difficulty of attributing a value to shares by awarding claimants any
decline in the market price of a security that the defendants' conduct
causes. 8 By awarding plaintiffs an amount equal to any change in the
market price of a security, the causation-in-fact measure compensates
I Impersonal Exchanges, supra note 4, at 306. In a nondisclosure situation, the defend-
ant makes no misrepresentations upon which investors rely. The Supreme Court in Af-
filiated Ute held that if an individual with a duty to disclose under rule 10b-5 fails to
disclose material inside information, the claimants for damages need not prove that reliance
upon the defendant's fraud induced the claimant to purchase or sell. 406 U.S. at 153-54; see
note 16 supra (discussion of Affiliated Ute). If the defendant makes positive misrepresenta-
tions about material information, however, claimants must prove they relied on the
misrepresentations. Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978); Simon v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1973).
' Impersonal Exchanges, supra note 4, at 306; Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1132.
67 635 F.2d at 170. The out-of-pocket measure of damages, which limits plaintiffs'
recovery to the difference between the purchase price and the actual value of the stock he
received, requires the court to attribute a value to the security as of the date of the
fraudulent transaction. Mullaney, supra note 13, at 281. A court could use the value of the
security on a date after public disclosure of the fraud as evidence of the value of the security on
the date of the fraudulent transaction. Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976). In Harris, the defrauded purchaser failed to
establish the value of his stock on the transaction date. Id. The Eighth Circuit permitted the
plaintiff to demonstrate his losses by establishing the value of the stock on a date after his
transaction, and after the public learned of the fraudulent conduct. Id. at 226. The Eighth
Circuit required the use of a date after public disclosure of the fraud since the public's
knowledge influences the value of stock. Id.
The Harris court's theory that the market price of the stock after public disclosure of
the fraud substantiates the stock's value on the transaction date assumes that the public
reaction to the information at the later date indicates how the public would have reacted to
earlier disclosures. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 170 (2d Cir. 1980). In con-
trast, the Tenth Circuit in Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1969), assessed the value of the stock on the date the plaintiff learned, or should
have learned, of the defendant's fraud. 402 F.2d at 104-05. In Esplin however, the plaintiff
and defendant dealt face-to-face rather than on a public exchange. Id. at 96.
" 635 F.2d at 171. The Elkind court noted that the causation-in-fact approach, based on
the change in the market price of shares, limits plaintiffs' recovery to the actual amount of
damage the defendants' insider trading causes, and avoids windfall recovery. Id. If the in-
sider trading fails to affect the market price, investors suffer no injury and consequently
receive no damages. Id.
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plaintiffs for the loss the insider trading cost the claimant, but avoids
awarding windfall recoveries. 9 The causation measure assumes that if
the defendants' insider trading does not affect the market price of the
security, the plaintiff occupies the same position that he would have oc-
cupied if the defendant refrained from trading."0
Since plaintiffs recover only when the defendants' conduct affects
the market price of shares, the causation approach may deny recovery
for the insider's violation of the duty to disclose the inside information.
7
1
Furthermore, if no injury to investors results unless the defendants'
fraudulent conduct affects the market price of the stock, the causation
method places a burden on the claimants to prove the time and extent to
which the defendants' conduct influenced the market price of shares.
7
1 If
the insiders trade only moderately in a heavily-traded security, claimants
may be unable to identify any change in market price the insider trading
causes.' Finally, a question arises whether the post-purchase decline in
the market price of stock injures the claimant as a shareholder rather
than as a purchaser or seller and thus precludes recovery under rule
10b-5.' Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 compensate investors for a defen-
dant's deceptive or manipulative conduct only when the conduct occurs
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.'5
" 635 F.2d at 171. The Elkind court assumed that limiting claimants' recovery to the
change in the stock's market price would limit defendants' liability in proportion to the ex-
tent of the defendants' fraudulent trading. Id. Excessive damage awards in open market
violations, however, arguably result from courts holding defendants liable to anyone who
trades during the nondisclosure period rather than courts requiring defendants to pay an in-
dividual plaintiff a large sum. See text accompanying note 9 supra (elimination of privity re-
quirement renders defendants liable to anyone who trades during nondisclosure of inside in-
formation).
, 635 F.2d at 171.
7 Id. No violation of § 10(b) occurs unless the defendant violated a duty to disclose
material nonpublic information. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980).
However, no absolute duty to disclose information exists. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 848, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The duty
to disclose arises when a defendant with a fiduciary duty to disclose trades the securities.
445 U.S. at 228. Thus, along with the presence of a fiduciary duty, the act of trading, in addi-
tion to the failure to disclose, causes the plaintiffs' injury. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
, See 635 F.2d at 171. Proof that insider trading caused investors' damages is difficult
to establish. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 320 n.27 (6th Cir. 1976); text accompany-
ing note 66 supra.
11 635 F.2d at 171. A court could easily measure a change in the market price of shares
attributable to the defendants' fraud if the defendants trade a large number of shares and
the market price increases or decreases substantially. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 353 F. Supp. 264, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). If the insider trades
only a few shares in a heavy volume market, the claimant would be unable to isolate an in-
crease or decrease in the market price of shares the defendants' conduct caused. 635 F.2d at
171.
7' 635 F.2d at 171.
" Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975) (no cause of action
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Congress designed the securities laws to prohibit fraudulent prac-
tices and to compensate investors who suffer losses due to insider
trading on the open market. 8 Since tort and restitution provide the foun-
dation for rule 10b-5 recoveries, fault and fairness play a major role in
determining defendants' liability." Thus, courts should continue to take
a flexible approach in fashioning damages in rule 10b-5 litigation. 8 By
considering the extent the defendants traded on inside information, the
impact of the defendants' trading on the market, the profits the defend-
ants realized, and the losses and expenses the plaintiffs incurred, courts
can design damage awards which most adequately deter fraud, compen-
sate injured investors, and preserve market integrity without destroy-
ing legitimate business activity."9
II. CONTRIBUTION & SETTLEMENT
The securities laws occasionally permit plaintiffs to recover ruinous
damages."s The possibility of excessive damages often influences defend-
ants to enter into settlement agreements with plaintiffs rather than risk
potentially disastrous liability.8 ' In multiparty litigation, however, one or
more defendants may wish to negotiate a settlement while others refuse
to settle." When a plaintiff enters into a settlement agreement with less
than all of the possible defendants, a question arises whether any non-
settling defendant subsequently found liable may assert a claim for con-
tribution from defendants who previously settled claims.
3
Contribution provides an equitable means of distributing a plaintiff's
when fraudulent statements caused investor not to trade); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (standing under rule 10b-5
limited to actual purchasers and sellers).
" See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abet-
ting Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597,
660 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder]; Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1133.
Ruder, supra note 76, at 665. Rule 10b-5 derives from the common law action in tort
for deceit. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d at 555. Liability under the law
of deceit requires that the complaint alledged that the defendant made an untrue statement
or material omission which caused the claimant's injury. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
685-86 (1971).
" Jacobs, supra note 3, at 1098-99 (extensive reach of rule 10b-5 precludes application
of single measure of damages).
" Note, Disgorgement Damages in Rule 10b-5 Class Actions, 11 STETSON L. REV. 126,
140 (1981).
' 635 F.2d at 170-71. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); 15 U.S.C. §§
77(b); 78i(e); 78r (1976); cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40
(1975).
8 See Mullaney, supra note 13, at 277. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-43 (1975).
82 See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwitch, 540 F.2d 27,29 (2d
Cir. 1976); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
1 Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multiparty Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 66
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losses among persons who acted independently or jointly to injure the
plaintiff."4 Each defendant pays a share of the plaintiff's damages,85 ap-
portioned either pro rata88 or according to each defendant's culpability,
extent of unjust enrichment, or degree of participation in the wrongful
conduct." Since contribution promotes the deterrence policy behind the
securities laws by guaranteeing that no defendant escapes liability for
damages," courts generally permit contribution in rule 10b-5 litigation. 9
IOWA L. REV. 533, 542-43 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Adamski]. A party may seek contribu-
tion by cross claim, by third party claim, by separate action, or by motion. Note, Contribu-
tion Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1256, 1283-84 [hereinafter cited
as Contribution]; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g); 14(a). If a party seeks contribution from a
person with unadjudicated liability, the claimant must file a separate action after the claimant
pays more than a fair share of the plaintiffs' damages. Contribution, supra, at 1285. A party
may claim contribution by post judgment motion if a prior judgment held all parties to the
motion liable for the plaintiffs' injury. Id.; see, e.g., Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Blair & Co., 404 U.S. 941 (1971). The question whether a nonset-
tling defendant may claim contribution from a settling defendant, however, does not arise
because no trial took place and no judgment established the settlor's liability. Whether set-
tlement extinguishes the right to contribution remains questionable because the settlement
agreement between the plaintiff and a defendant fails to release the settling defendant's
liability to other defendants. Contribution, supra, at 1293; see, e.g.., Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
3114 (1981).
Fisher, Contribution in 10b-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAW 1821, (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Fisher]. Contribution, which allocates liability for the plaintiff's loss among several in-
dividuals, differs from indemnification, which shifts financial responsibility for the entire
loss to one individual who pays the judgment for another. Ruder, supra note 76, at 647. The
rationale behind contribution dictates that parties who jointly cause the plaintiff's injury
should share liability for damages. Id. at 647-48.
American courts traditionally refused to permit either intentional or negligent tort-
feasors the right to assert a claim for contribution. Id. at 648; see, e.g., Union Stock Yards
Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 467 (3d
Cir. 1967). The no-contribution rule assumes that an individual who possesses sole liability
for his negligent or intentional acts will exercise a greater degree of care than he would ex-
ercise if he could share responsibility for his conduct. Ruder, supra note 76, at 649; Wilson
P. Abraham Construc. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
granted sub nom. Texas Industries v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 449 U.S. 949 (1980). Whether
this is a valid assumption depends upon whether the particular defendant hesitates more by
the slight chance of a substantial loss or the great chance of a small loss. Cf. Note, Contribu-
tions in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 682, 702 (1978).
85 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 50 at 310 (4th ed. 1971).
N Fisher, supra note 84, at 1821. A pro rata allocation of damages distributes defendants'
liability for plaintiffs' loss equally among defendants without regard to fault. Ruder, supra
note 76, at 650 n.239.
Fisher, supra note 84, at 1821-22.
5b A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5, § 264.02[c], at 11-329 (1980); see, e.g.,
Hezier Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979); Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp.
1271, 1278 (E.D. La. 1979); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
" See Contribution, supra note 83, at 1282. A party may seek contribution by cross
claim, by third party claim, by separate action, or by motion. Id. at 1283-84; see, e.g., Heizer
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While contribution equitably distributes among liable parties the costs
of compensating plaintiffs, a rule permitting contribution from settling
defendants often works contrary to public policy by discouraging settle-
ment."
Although some liability provisions of the securities laws expressly
authorize defendants' right to seek contribution,9 the '34 Act neglects to
address whether a right to contribution exists among defendants in rule
10b-5 litigation.9 One federal court refused to imply a right to contribu-
tion under section 10(b) absent express congressional approval. Since
Congress included a contribution clause in sections of the securities laws
where Congress anticipated courts would hold multiple parties liable,
courts have implied a right to contribution under other sections which
generate multiple liability. 4 Reasoning that an implied right to contribu-
Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979) (separate action for contribution); State
Mutual Life Assur. Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63 F.R.D. 389, 391-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (cross claims, counterclaims, and third party claims for contribution);
Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 442
F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Blair & Co., 404 U.S.
941 (1971) (postjudgment motion for contribution); affd in part and vacated in part, 435
F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo.
1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970) (third party complaint for contribution).
" Adamski, supra note 83, at 542; see text accompanying notes 130 & 131 infra.
" Several sections of the Securities Acts expressly authorize contribution from joint
defendants "as in cases of contract." See, e.g., '33 Act section 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976)
(fraudulent registration statements); '34 Act section 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976)
(manipulative misconduct affecting price of securities); '34 Act section 18(b), 15 U.S.C. §
78r(b) (1976) (fraudulent statements on documents filed. pursuant to securities laws). One
district court decided that since Congress explicitly authorized a right to contribution in
certain civil liability provisions of the securities acts, a contribution right must exist
whenever civil liability exists. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D.
Colo. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). Other courts granted contribution among
defendants as a necessary and appropriate means of enforcing the implied statutory right
under § 10(b). Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979) citing Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) (Rule 10b-5); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Blair & Co., 404 U.S. 941 (1971) (Rule 10b-5 and § 17(a) of
the '33 Act). Thus, courts implied a right to contribution under § 10(b) because liability
under 10(b) was implied. 286 F. Supp. at 815-16. Some civil liability provisions in the
securities act, however, do not provide for contribution. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77o (1976); 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b), 78t (1976). Arguably, therefore, Congress lacked a consistent policy in favor
of contribution. Adamski, supra note 83, at 538. In the absence of any congressional intent
to deny contribution under the express liability sections of securities laws, courts continue
to grant contribution when the court implies liability. See, e.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601
F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979) (§ 10(b) of '34 Act); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F.
Supp. 946, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (§ 12(2) of '33 Act).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
9 See State Mutual Life Assur. Co. of America v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49
F.R.D. 202, 212-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
" See Contribution, supra note 83, at 1258, 1280; 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION,
1739-40 n.178 (1961); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Law Research Serv., Inc.
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tion encourages compliance with the securities laws by potentially ex-
posing all culpable parties to liability for damages, the majority of lower
courts now extend an implied right of contribution ancillary to the im-
plied right of action under rule 10b-521
The securities acts also fail to mention whether a nonsettling defend-
ant may seek contribution from a defendant who previously settled the
claim with the plaintiff. In addition, the Supreme Court has declined to
consider the settling defendant's liability to a nonsettling defendant. 8
Two lower federal courts, however, recently granted defendants charged
with rule 10b-5 violations a right to claim contribution from other defend-
ants who settled their claims with the plaintiffs.
In In re National Student Marketing Litigation," the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia permitted a defendant in rule
10b-5 litigation to assert a cross claim for contribution against a settling
defendant." The plaintiff-shareholders sought damages against National
Student Marketing Corporation, two law firms, and an accounting firm
for alleged violations of federal securities laws.9 Each defendant
asserted cross claims for contribution and indemnification.' 0 One of the
v. Blair & Co., 404 U.S. 941 (1971) (contribution under § 10(b) of the '34 Act and § 17(a) of the
'33 Act); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968), affd, 435
F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). The Globus court noted that general principles of statutory inter-
pretation require that courts construe the securities statutes together. 318 F. Supp. at 958.
The Globus court interpreted the '33 and '34 Acts as a single regulatory scheme and decided
that since the specific liability provisions in the securities acts granted contribution, the
right to contribution impliedly existed whenever a court implied liability under securities
law. Id.
,1 See, e.g., Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp.
230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 724 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
" Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 635 F.2d 672, 674-76 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3114 (1981). In Laventhol, purchasers of limited partner-
ship interests sued the underwriters and controlling persons of the limited partnership for
issuing a false and misleading prospectus in connection with the sale of interests in the part-
nership. Id. at 673. The controlling persons negotiated a court-approved settlement with the
purchasers, and then moved for summary judgment to dismiss the underwriters' cross
claims for contribution and indemnification. Id. at 674. The Ninth Circuit declined to dismiss
the cross claims. Id. The Laventhol court pointed out that although the securities statutes
fail to account for contribution from a settling defendant, contribution promotes the policies
behind the securities laws by prohibiting any wrongdoer from escaping liability, and by
enlarging the potential source of reimbursement for damages for injured investors. Id. at
675. The Laventhol court, however, noted that the settling defendants settled with plain-
tiffs for only $8,000 although the plaintiffs filed suit for $2,000,000 in damages. Id. at 674-75.
The Ninth Circuit may have reached a different result if the underwriters paid plaintiffs
their fair share of damages. See, e.g., id. at 675; Herzfeld v. Lavethol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1976) (defendant relinquishes joint tortfeasor status
when defendant pays more than half of plaintiff's total loss).
" 517 F. Supp. 1345 (D.D.C. 1981).
"Id. at 1346; see text accompanying note 89 supra.
Id. at 1345.
'"Id. at 1346. The defendants in National Student asserted claims for both indem-
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defendants then negotiated a court-approved settlement with the plain-
tiff class, who agreed to indemnify the settling defendant for all claims
any nonsettling defendant asserted against the settlor."' The district
court refused to grant the settling defendant's motion to dismiss the
cross claims for contribution. 102 The National Student court decided that
an implied right to contribution existed under rule 10b-5 ancillary to the
rule's implied cause of action."0 ' Since Congress expressly provided for
contribution in three of the seven express civil remedies in the
securities acts,' the court reasoned that Congress intended to grant
joint tortfeasors the right of contribution.'0' In addition, since the goal of
contribution is to distribute liability for the plaintiff's losses equitably
among responsible parties, 6 a nonsettling defendant may demand con-
tribution from a settling defendant who failed to pay a fair portion of the
plaintiffs damages. 7 The National Student court reasoned that
although a settlement agreement eliminates the settling defendant's
liability to the plaintiff class, the agreement fails to alter any
defendant's liability to defendants not a party to the settlement.'
In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean °0 the Fifth Circuit also at-
tempted to distribute the plaintiffs loss equitably among wrongdoers by
implying a right to contribution among defendants in rule 10b-5 litiga-
tion."0 In Huddleston, a group of underwriters sold a new issue of Texas
nification and contribution until the court established each party's culpability. Id. While a
defendant who was not liable for a rule 10b-5 violation could claim indemnification, a defendant
who was partially liable could request contribution from other wrongdoers. See Madigan,
Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1974); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F.
Supp. 809, 815 (D. Colo. 1968), affl'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
.01 517 F. Supp. at 1346; see text accompanying notes 130-134 infra.
102 517 F. Supp. at 1349. The defendants in National Student who settled with the plain-
tiff requested the court to dismiss the other defendants' cross claims so the settlor could
avoid additional involvement in future litigation. Id. at 1346. The National Student court
decided that dismissing the cross claim for contribution before the court established each
defendant's liability was unfair to the nonsettling defendants. Id. at 1349; see text accompa-
nying notes 132-134 infra.
103 517 F. Supp. at 1348; see text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
I See § 11 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(f); §§ 9 and 18 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
78i(e); 78r(b) (1976). Courts imply a right to contribution under four express civil liability
provisions of the securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 771, 77o (1976); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p, 78t (1976).
101 517 F. Supp. at 1348; see also text accompanying notes 88-90 supra.
Adamski, supra note 83, at 536; see text accompanying note 84 supra.
" 517 F. Supp. at 1347; Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 (1955).
"1 517 F. Supp. at 1347. A settlement fails to release a defendant's liability to other
defendants who were not parties to the settlement. Id.; Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3114 (1981).
'1 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981); see text accompanying notes 19-30 supra; text accompa-
nying notes 110-121 infra.
.. See 640 F.2d at 559. In Huddleston, purchasers of securities sued the directors of a
corporation who filed an allegedly fraudulent registration statement and prospectus with
the SEC. Id. at 539; see text accompanying notes 20-30 supra; 111-117 infra.
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International Speedway (TIS) securities to the public pursuant to a
registration statement and corporate issuer's prospectus that TIS filed
with the SEC."' When TIS later filed a petition for Chapter X bankruptcy,
purchasers of the securities sued TIS' directors and the accounting firm
that prepared the registration statement for losses the purchasers
allegedly incurred when they bought the securities.' After the under-
writer-defendants settled with the plaintiffs on the liability issue,' the
District Court for the Northern District of Texas ordered separate trials
on the issue of the directors' and accountants' liability and the issue of
damages.' When the jury held the directors and accountants liable for
recklessly preparing a materially misleading prospectus, 15 the directors
asserted a claim for contribution from the underwriters. 6 The district
court ruled that no cause of action existed for contribution from defend-
ants who settled with the plaintiffs.'
The Fifth Circuit in Huddleston reversed the district court's refusal
to grant nonsettling defendants' claim for contribution from settling
defendants."' The Fifth Circuit decided that while contribution deters
violation of the securities laws by potentially subjecting all wrongdoers
to liability, disallowance of contribution fails to deter violations of the
securities laws by wrongdoers who the plaintiff neglects to name in the
lawsuit."' The knowledge that a plaintiff might force the entire loss on
another defendant might encourage potential wrongdoers to be less
cautious about complying with the securities laws and avoiding
fraudulent conduct than if the wrongdoer believed that another defendant
could seek contribution from all wrongdoers."' The Huddleston court
concluded that multiparty litigation under rule 10b-5 required an implied
"1 640 F.2d at 539; see text accompanying note 21 supra.
'2 640 F.2d at 539; see text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
,13 Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 4.
11' Id.
"1 640 F.2d at 544; 547. The Fifth Circuit remanded Huddleston to the district court
because the district court failed to submit the issues of reliance and causation to the jury.
Id. at 549. The reliance requirement under rule 10b-5 demands that the plaintiff prove he
would have acted differently if the defendant disclosed the truth. Id.; Simon v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1973). Causation re-
quires that the information the defendant misrepresented proximately caused the plaintiffs'
loss. 640 F.2d at 549; Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970).
1,6 640 F.2d at 539, 556. In Huddleston, the district court approved the settlement be-
tween the purchaser-plaintiffs and underwriter-defendant before trial on the liability issue,
but declined to treat the settlement as the release of a joint tortfeasor. Id. at 539. Upon final
judgment the district court disallowed the nonsettling defendants' cross claims for contribu-
tion, but reduced the nonsettling defendants liability by the amount the settlors paid the
plaintiffs. Id. at 539; see text accompanying note 129 infra.
' 640 F.2d at 556.
" Id. at 559.
' Id. at 558; see text accompanying note 81 supra; 124-127 infra.
"' 640 F.2d at 558; see text accompanying note 84 supra.
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right of contribution to ensure a fair distribution of liability for
plaintiff's injuries.
12'
The Elkind and Huddleston courts recognized that the right to con-
tribution both deters violations of the securities laws by potentially sub-
jecting all wrongdoers to liability,'22 and equitably distributes the plain-
tiff's damages among the parties responsible for the loss." Knowledge
that a court will hold each wrongdoer liable for his proportionate share
of the plaintiff's damages whether or not the plaintiff names every
defendant in the lawsuit encourages caution among defendants in at-
tempting to comply with the securities laws. A rule against contribution
fails to provide sufficient deterrence for defendants who believe the
plaintiffs will force the entire loss on another defendant. 124 Furthermore,
a no-contribution rule promotes collusion between a plaintiff and defend-
ants. A plaintiff may settle with one defendant for a nominal amount and
require the nonsettling defendant to pay more than his proportionate
share of damages. 2 ' The argument that a defendant assumes the risk of
paying a disproportionate share of the plaintiff's loss when the defen-
dant opts for trial presupposes that the plaintiff offered the nonsettling
defendant a reasonable settlement.2 1 In addition, a prohibition against
contribution supplies plaintiffs with a tactical advantage. A plaintiff may
sue numerous defendants, settle with a few for nominal amounts, and
hope that the fear of paying a disproportionate share of the damages en-
.21 640 F.2d at 558-59. The Huddleston court noted that multiparty litigation involving
large monetary claims and litigation costs and lengthy trials rendered obsolete the common
law rule against contribution among intentional tortfeasors. Id. at 558; see text accompany-
ing note 84 supra. Although settlements usually promote judicial efficiency by terminating
litigation, the no-contribution rule actually may encourage litigation. Id. A plaintiff may sue
numerous defendants who choose to settle rather than pay litigation costs, thus providing
the plaintiff with finances to litigate against nonsettling defendants. Id.; see also text ac-
companying notes 124-127 infra (effects of no contribution rule on settlement).
2 See text accompanying notes 119-120 supra.
1 Fisher, supra note 84, at 1833; see also Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th
Cir. 1979); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230,
238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Liggett & Myers, Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd,
442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Blair & Co., 404
U.S. 941 (1971).
" Ruder, supra note 76, at 649. See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed.
1971). By consistently granting a right to contribution among multiple wrongdoers under
those provisions of the securities acts with express civil liability or where the courts imply
civil liability, a court may promote fairness not only by protecting a single tortfeasor from
bearing the plaintiff's entire loss, but also by providing uniformity in the law of contribu-
tion. Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1276 (E.D. La. 1979); Fisher, supra note 84, at
1829. The contribution rule also promoted fairness to plaintiffs by supplying plaintiffs with
a broader source of reimbursement. Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979).
" See Adamski, supra note 83, at 553; text accompanying note 127 infra.
1W Adamski, supra note 83, at 550 & n.113; text accompanying note 127 infra.
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courages other defendants to settle for more money than they otherwise
would agree to pay."n
While an implied right to contribution may deter violations of the
securities laws by subjecting all wrongdoers to liability, the right to con-
tribution tends to discourage settlement. By granting nonsettling
defendants an implied right to contribution, courts refuse to permit a
settlement agreement to extinguish the settling defendant's liability to
the defendant who declined to settle." An agreement which fails to
release a defendant from future liability provides little incentive for a
defendant to settle with a plaintiff.13 Thus, the right to contribution
arguably undermines public policy by. discouraging settlement
agreements. 3'
One way parties may minimize the disincentive to settle that the
right to contribution creates is by including an indemnity provision in
the settlement agreement. In an indemnity provision the plaintiff offers
to compensate the settlor for all future claims that nonsettling defendants
'" Fisher, supra note 84, at 1832-35. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) reduces the
potential for collusion between plaintiffs and defendants by requiring court approval of the
reasonableness and fairness of settlement in a 8lass action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which releases the settlor from further
liability and provides for reduction by settlement amount, requires that the parties make
the settlement in good faith. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4 (1955).
128 Adamski, supra note 83, at 546.
1 See, e.g., Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 675
(9th Cir. 1980); Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Adamski,
supra note 83, at 544-45. Several courts which held that settlement extinguishes the right to
contribution refused to require settling defendants to contribute to the judgment award
against nonsettling defendants. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Hor-
wath, 540 F.2d 27, 39 (2d Cir. 1976); Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 387 F.
Supp. 163, 171 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). In Herzfeld and Gould,
however, the courts released the settling defendants because each settlor paid more than
his equitable share of the plaintiffs' damages. 540 F.2d at 39; 387 F. Supp. at 171. The
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides that a good faith settlement
automatically releases the settlor from claims for contribution. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION
AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4(b) (1955). The settlement then reduces the judgment against
the plaintiff by the amount the settlor paid the plaintiff. Id. § 4.
11 See Adamski, supra note 83, at 546. Even if courts refuse to permit a settlement to
extinguish the right to contribution, defendants benefit from settlement by avoiding addi-
tional costs of future litigation. Handek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders'Ac-
tions-Part II, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 798 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Handek]. A defendant also
benefits from compromising with the plaintiff if the plaintiff agrees to indemnify the defend-
ant for contribution claims asserted against the settlor or by releasing the nonsettling
defendants from the settlor's share of the total damages. See Adamski, supra note 83, at
546; text accompanying notes 132 & 133 infra.
13 See Contribution, supra note 83, at 1294. Public policy favors settlement because
settlement reduces unnecessary litigation. Adamski, supra note 83, at 543. Settlement
results in judicial economy, ensures the plaintiff immediate compensation, and frees the
defendant from litigation to return to the regular course of business. Id.
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assert against the settling defendant."'2 An indemnity provision en-
courages defendants to settle by providing the settlor with sufficient
assurance of freedom from further liability. 3 However, although indem-
nification agreements encourage settlement by releasing the settling
defendant from future liability, a plaintiff's agreement to indemnify a
defendant arguably runs contrary to the deterrence objective of con-
tribution by permitting the settling defendant to escape liability for his
fair share of the plaintiff's injury.134
Courts may encourage settlement, deter fraudulent conduct, and en-
sure that each defendant pay his fair share of the plaintiffs' losses by im-
plying a right to contribution under rule 10b-5 and by allowing settle-
ment to both extinguish the right of contribution and reduce the judg-
ment award by the settling defendant's proportionate share.135 Implying
a right to contribution deters fraudulent conduct by potentially subject-
ing each wrongdoer to liability for his share of the plaintiffs' damages.
1 36
Assuming the court will require the settlor to contribute only his propor-
,31 Contribution, supra note 83, at 1300-03. The plaintiffs' agreement to indemnify settl-
ing defendants for contribution claims in effect reduces the judgment against the nonsettl-
ing defendants by the settling defendant's share. Id. at 1302 n.261. The Fifth Circuit in-
dicated in dictum that no right to indemnification exists between wrongdoers in a securities
case since the wrongdoers are both cupable. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705
n.7 (5th Cir. 1969). The Second Circuit, however, indicated indemnification exists between
joint wrongdoers when one defendant proves another defendant was "more liable." Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970). A plaintiff also may encourage defendants to settle by agreeing to release a settling
defendant from future liability and by reducing the demand from the nonsettling defendants
to reflect the settlement. Adamski, supra note 83, at 546.
13 See text accompanying note 138 infra. A plaintiff's agreement to indemnify settling
defendants for contribution claims benefits the settlor by limiting his liability to the settle-
ment amount, and benefits the nonsettling defendant by reducing the judgment by the set-
tlor's share. Id.
" McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). Courts often refuse to enforce indemnification of an intentional
tortfeasor by other defendants. Id. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Odette v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The rule against indemnification
assumes that a wrongdoer's knowledge that he possesses sole liability for his misconduct in-
duces him to exercise a greater degree of care than he would exercise if liability were
shared. Cf. Ruder, supra note 76, at 649.
" See Adamski, supra note 83, at 572-73. One commentator advocates continued
judicial flexibility rather than hard and fast rules in contribution claims to encourage settle-
ment, equitably allocate liability, and deter violations of securities laws. Contribution, supra
note 83, at 1314. See also text accompanying note 32 supra (Congress intended flexibility). A
uniform policy regarding contribution, however, encourages settlement and aids parties in
structuring acceptable settlement agreements. See Griffith, Hemsley & Barr, Contribution,
Indemnity, Settlement and Releases: What the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence
Statute Did Not Say, 24 VILL. L. REV. 494, 515 (1978) (parties hesitate to settle when finality
of settlement remains uncertain).
" See text accompanying notes 119-121 supra.
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tionate share of all the defendants' total liability, and assuming the
nonsettling defendant will adequately represent the settlor's cause, the
settlement saves the settlor the additional time and expense of con-
tinued litigation.37 Reducing the award by the amount the settling defend-
ant actually pays, however, often leaves the nonsettling defendant liable
for more than his fair share of the plaintiff's loss.'38 Reducing the judg-
ment award by the settling defendant's proportionate share, rather than
by the amount the defendant actually pays, discourages plaintiffs from
settling with some defendants for unreasonably low amounts in order to
burden one defendant with disproportionate liability or to gain a tactical
advantage.'39
The implied right of action under rule 10b-5 of the '34 Act permits
private investors to recover damages for losses caused by insider
trading.40 The right to contribution ensures that defendants who violate
the antifraud provisions of the securities acts compensate injured in-
vestors.' To ensure that the contribution right does not deter set-
tlements, however, courts should permit settlement to extinguish the
right to contribution, while reducing the judgment award against
nonsettling defendants by the settlor's proportionate share of the defend-
... Handek, supra note 130, at 798; see also In re National Student Marketing Litiga-
tion, 68 F.R.D. 151, 155-56 (D.D.C. 1974) (defendant negotiated settlement to avoid adverse
effect of damages on defendant's position in business community); text accompanying note
131 supra.
1' See Adamski, supra note 83, at 544. Settlement reduces the judgment award either
by the amount the settling defendant paid the plaintiff, or by the settlor's proportionate
share of the damages. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1277 (D. Del. 1978)
(reduction by settlor's share of damages); UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TQRTFEASORS ACT
§ 4 (1955) (reduction by settlement amount); UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 6 (1955)
(reduction by settlor's share of damages). See also text accompanying note 132 supra; note
139 infra.
"' See Contribution, supra note 83, at 1303-04. A court may apportion damages according
to the defendants' pro rata share of the plaintiff's liability without regard to fault. Ruder,
supra note 76, at 650; see, e.g., Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). A pro rata allocation of damages distributes the plaintiffs losses among
defendants by dividing the plaintiff's total loss by the number of defendants. In McLean v.
Alexander, however, the court rejected pro rata contribution and demanded instead con-
tribution according to defendants' proportionate fault. McLean v. Alexander, a49 F. Supp.
1251, 1276 (D. Del. 1978). In McLean the purchaser of a closely-held corporation sued the cor-
poration, the corporation's accountant, and the investment banking firm for fraudulently in-
ducing his purchase. Id. at 1255. The corporation and banking firm settled with the plaintiff,
and the court held the accountant liable. Id. at 1275-76. The court held the accountants liable
for 10 percent and the other sellers for 90 percent of the plaintiff's damages. Id. at 1272-73.
The McLean court considered the corporation and banking firm as a single entity in appor-
tioning the purchasers damages to reflect the defendants' relative fault. Id. See also Wassel
v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.
1976) (court grouped defendants to assess relative culpability).
14' See text accompanying note 1 supra.
"' Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979); see text accompanying note
124 supra.
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ants' total liability. " 2 This method both encourages settlement and
equitably distributes liability among all culpable parties in rule 10b-5
litigation." '
DIANE P. CAREY
142 See text accompanying notes 135-37 supra.
" Adamski, supra note 83, at 572-73. Only the plaintiff stands to lose if contribution ex-
tinguishes settlement and reduces the judgment award. Before trial and judgment the par-
ties may be unable to determine the proportionate share of a particular defendant's liability.
See Contribution, supra note 83, at 1301. Thus, the plaintiff may go uncompensated for that
amount if the plaintiff settles with the defendant for less than the amount for which the
court holds the settlor liable. Id. The plaintiff is in control, however, to name a settlement
price. If defendants refuse, the plaintiff may litigate.
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